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A recent Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposal raises
some interesting questions that lie at the intersection of data-security, se-
curities regulation, and legal theory. The SEC's proposal considers whether
to exempt certain small public companies from Section 404 of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).1 Section 404 requires public companies
to provide management assessment and external auditing of a company's
internal control systems over financial data. 2 Some have complained vigo-
* Associate Professor, University of Florida College of Law; B.A., Yale University; J.D.,
LL.M., M.Phil., Ph.D., Columbia University. I wish to thank Andrea M. Matwyshyn for thoughtful
criticism and Dustin Hall for excellent research assistance on this and other projects. This short essay
was based on a symposium speech given in early 2006. Despite some updated footnotes to support
general claims, the essay does not incorporate legal developments since the date of the 2006 sympo-
sium.
1. Exposure Draft of Final Report of Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies, Re-
lease No. 33-8666, 71 Fed. Reg. 11,090 (proposed Mar. 3, 2006). For a discussion of the proposal, see
Advisory Letter from James D. Cox, Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, Duke University School of
Law, et al. to Christopher Cox, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission (Mar. 21, 2006),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/265-23/26523-309.pdf. The SEC recently announced that it
is performing a cost-benefit analysis of the proposed exemption. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Begins
Small Business Costs and Benefits Study of Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404 (Feb. 1, 2008), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-8.htm.
2. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404, 116 Stat. 745, 789 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006)). For a general discussion of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see, for example, Wil-
liam J. Camey, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of "Going Private," 55
EMORY L.J. 141 (2006); Ginger Carroll, Thinking Small: Adjusting Regulatory Burdens Incurred by
Small Public Companies Seeking to Comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 443 (2006);
Lisa M. Fairfax, Sarbanes-Oxley, Corporate Federalism, and the Declining Significance of Federal
Reforms on State Director Independence Standards, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 381 (2005); Peter Ferola,
Internal Controls in the Aftermath of Sarbanes-Oxley: One Size Doesn't Fit All, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 87
(2006); Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1817
(2007); Kate Litvak, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Cross-Listing Premium, 105 MICH. L. REv. 1857 (2007);
Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, The Use of Efficient Market Hypothesis: Beyond Sox, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 1941 (2007); Lumen N. Mulligan, What's Good for the Goose is not Good for the Gander:
Sarbanes-Oxley-Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981 (2007); Manuel A. Utset, Time-
Inconsistent Management & the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 417 (2005); Thomas War-
dell, Esq., The Current State of Play Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 935 (2003); David A. Westbrook, Telling All: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Ideal of Transpa-
rency, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 441; Alyson M. Bagley, Note, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Leap of Faith:
Why Investors Should Trust Corporate Executives and Accountants, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 79 (2004);
Ian L. Schaffer, Note, An International Train Wreck Caused in Part by a Defective Whistle: When the
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rously that the costs of compliance, at least for small public companies,
greatly outweigh any potential benefits.
3
The basic fiduciary duty of care that directors and officers owe to a
corporation, however, may require smaller companies to embrace enhanced
internal control measures, despite any exemption from Section 404 granted
by the SEC. Quite simply, in light of the "state of the art" regarding inter-
nal controls pursuant to Section 404 and the financial collapses that gave
rise to SOX in the first place, the bar for satisfying the duty of care regard-
ing internal control systems may have risen outside the statutory frame-
work of SOX.
To the extent the fiduciary duty of care would independently require
directors and officers to adopt enhanced internal controls over financial
data, the task of defining a minimally acceptable monitoring system would
ultimately fall not on legislatures or administrative agencies but instead on
judges tasked with resolving shareholder suits.4 While reliance on the flex-
ibility of evolving common law rules may prove especially attractive in
certain contexts, such as Internet regulation,5 giving judges the primary
responsibility for defining the proper scope of internal data control meas-
ures could produce more jurisprudential and practical problems than bene-
fits. As a result, exempting certain small public companies from the
certification and audit requirements under Section 404 of SOX would seem
wrongheaded.
I. SOX AND THE EXEMPTION PROPOSAL
Congress adopted SOX in 2002 in the midst of the financial and ac-
Extraterritorial Application of Sox Conflicts with Foreign Laws, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1829 (2006).
3. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
229, 241-42 (2007); Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX 404,
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 703,729-30 (2007).
4. For a discussion of the relationship of Sarbanes-Oxley to traditional issues of corporate gover-
nance, see, for example, J. Robert Brown, Jr., Criticizing the Critics: Sarbanes-Oxley and Quack Cor-
porate Governance, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 309 (2006); Regina F. Burch, Director Oversight and
Monitoring: The Standard of Care and the Standard of Liability Post-Enron, 6 Wyo. L. REv. 481
(2006); Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act:
A Morality Tale for Policymakers, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251 (2005); Nadelle Grossman, Director
Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary Duties in a Climate of Corporate Governance Reform, 12
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 393 (2007); Aulana Peters, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Congress' Re-
sponse to Corporate Scandals: Will the New Rules Guarantee "Good" Governance and Avoid Future
Scandals?, 28 NOVA L. REV. 283 (2004); Philip F.S. Berg, Note, Unfit To Serve: Permanently Barring
People from Serving as Officers and Directors of Publicly Traded Companies After the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1871 (2003); Gordon S. Kaiser, Jr., Comment, Fiduciary Responsibilities Under
the Sarbanes-Oxley Design, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 627 (2005).
5. See Michael R. Siebecker, Cookies and the Common Law: Are Internet Advertisers Trespass-
ing on our Computers?, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 893 (2003).
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counting scandals involving Enron, WorldCom and other corporate giants.
On a large scale, those scandals threatened the basic integrity of the Ameri-
can capital markets. On a more parochial level, the corporate collapses
significantly affected countless lives of individuals connected to the corpo-
ration, whether investors, employees or members of the community in
which the collapse occurred.
SOX arguably represents the most significant set of regulations since
the establishment of the modem securities regulation regime.6 One of the
primary goals motivating Congress was a desire to provide added safe-
guards that improve investor confidence in the accuracy of the financial
disclosures of public companies.7 While prior to SOX, publicly available
financial information was based in large part simply on the data companies
ultimately reported to auditors, SOX requires additional measures to safe-
guard the veracity of that underlying data and to improve the reliability of
corporate disclosures.
To that end, Section 404 of SOX mandates that public companies
include an "internal control report" in their annual report. 8 This control
report must include an assessment and certification by management of the
effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting and an external
audit and attestation of the control report.9 Although neither SOX nor the
SEC Rules prescribe exactly what internal controls a company must em-
ploy, the Rules provide a "safe harbor" from liability to the extent the con-
trols comport with standards promulgated by "a suitable, recognized
control framework that is established by a body or group that has followed
due-process procedures, including broad distribution of the framework for
6. See Ellen P. Aprill, What Critiques of Sarbanes-Oxley Can Teach About Regulation of Non-
profit Governance, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 765 (2007).
7. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 2 (noting that the Act is "an act to protect investors by improving
the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other
purposes").
8. Id. § 404. For a discussion of internal controls and auditing, see, for example, Matthew J.
Barrett, "Tax Services" as a Trojan Horse in the Auditor Independence Provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley,
2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 463; Erica Beecher-Monas, Enron, Epistemology, and Accountability: Regulat-
ing in a Global Economy, 37 IND. L. REV. 141 (2003); Peter Ferola, Internal Controls in the Aftermath
of Sarbanes-Oxley: One Size Doesn't Fit All, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 87 (2006); Daniel L. Goelzer, Auditing
Under Sarbanes-Oxley: An Interim Report, 7 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 1 (2007); Donald C. Langevoort, Inter-
nal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate Law's "Duty of Care as Responsibility for
Systems," 31 J. CORP. L. 949 (2006); Joseph A. Castelluccio I1l, Note, Sarbanes-Oxley and Small
Business: Section 404 and the Case for a Small Business Exemption, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 429 (2005);
Amy Grynol Gibbs, Note, It's About Time: The Scope of Section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 38 GA. L. REV. 1403 (2004); Tosha Huffman, Note, Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act:
Where the Knee Jerk Bruises Shareholders and Lifts the External Auditor, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 239
(2004).




These internal control requirements in Section 404 relate to data secu-
rity in at least two important ways. 11 First, a fairly recent study indicates
that 99% of worldwide business data is digital or electronic rather than
paper-based. 12 That digital or electronic data serves as the source informa-
tion for the mandatory financial disclosures of public companies. Without
effective internal information security controls, that source data can be
changed, manipulated, created or deleted, perhaps without any means to
detect or correct those alterations. Thus, absent adequate security controls,
companies cannot ensure the accuracy of their financial disclosures.
Second, companies cannot accurately report the value of their "intel-
lectual property" assets, such as trade secrets or copyrights, without ade-
quate internal controls. 13 A simple example should make this clear.
Consider the recipe for a signature soft drink of a publicly traded beverage
company. That recipe ostensibly represents a trade secret, the value of
which a company would typically report as "goodwill" on its balance
sheet. 14 Of course, trade secrets are only valuable insofar as they are actual-
ly secret. If the beverage company digitally stores the soft drink recipe but
does not have adequate internal controls that prevent access to the informa-
tion, then nothing ensures that the recipe was actually secret when the
company reported the recipe's value. If the secret recipe is not actually
secret, the value of the intellectual property asset will necessarily be lower
than reported in the company's financial statements. 15
Despite the importance of internal information controls to the integrity
of financial disclosures, the proposal before the SEC would exempt approx-
imately 80% of public companies from some or all of SOX Section 404's
internal control requirements. 16 While "small public companies" ' 17 would
10. See Rules and Regulations Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 17
C.F.R. § 240.13a- 15(c) (2008). For an example of a qualifying safe-harbor framework, see, for exam-
ple, Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, Guidance on Monitoring
Internal Control Systems, http://www.coso.org/IC.HTM (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
11. For a general discussion of many other substantial connections between data security and
Section 404 of SOX, see Bruce H. Nearon et. al., Life After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Merger ofInformation
Security and Accountability, 45 JURIMETRICS 379 (2005).
12. Peter Lyman & Hal R. Varian, How Much Information?, http://www.sims.Berkeley.edu/how-
much-info-2003/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
13. See Bradford K. Newman, Protecting Trade Secrets: Dealing with the Brave New World of
Employee Mobility, 17 DEC Bus. L. TODAY 25, 26-27 (2005).
14. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, Corporate Information
Security, and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 129, 191 (2007).
15. Id.
16. See Cox et al., supra note 1.
17. Small public companies have a market capitalization of less than $787 million. See Exposure
Draft of Final Report of Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies, Release No. 33-8666, 71
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be exempt only from the external audit requirement, "microcap compa-
nies"18 would be exempt from both the external audit as well as the man-
agement assessment and certification requirements. 19 Among other
arguments to support the exemptions, proponents suggest that impact of
fraud involving small and microcap companies would not have a signifi-
cant effect on the overall integrity of the capital markets, the market al-
ready accounts for the greater risk associated with investing in smaller
rather than larger companies, and the excessively high costs of compliance
for small companies relative to larger public companies.
II. DATA SECURITY AND THE DUTY OF CARE
The project here is to examine whether a fiduciary duty of care might
require officers and directors to adopt internal control systems, perhaps
substantially similar to those envisioned by SOX, even if the SEC exempts
the companies they serve from the ambit of the statute.
The duty of care requires that directors and officers act with "ordinary
prudence" on behalf of the corporation. 20 Although the precise standard
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction 2' and depends on statutes and com-
mon law principles, the duty of care generally involves three component
duties. First, the duty to act in good faith requires that directors and officers
act honestly, without conflicts of interest, and without condoning illegal
activities. Second, the duty to employ a reasonable decision-making
process forces directors and officers to make informed decisions based on
adequate inquiries, monitoring of company policies and effective consulta-
tion with experts. Third, the duty to make reasonable decisions prohibits
completely irrational decisions that result in an utter waste of corporate
assets.
Appreciating the reach of the duty of care, however, requires under-
standing a closely related doctrine, the business judgment rule. The busi-
ness judgment rule is a wide-spread common law presumption that
business judgments of corporate officers and directors in fact satisfy the
duty of care. 22 Overcoming the presumption presents an exceptionally dif-
ficult task for litigants. In general, plaintiffs must demonstrate a director's
Fed. Reg. 11,090, 11,091 (proposed Mar. 3, 2006).
18. Microcap companies have a market capitalization of less than $128 million. See id.
19. Id. at 11,104-05.
20. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 871 (Del. 1985).
21. Notable distinctions exist among the standards in Delaware, in New York, and in those states
that have adopted the Model Business Corporation Act.
22. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
2010]
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or officer's lack of good faith (typically through fraud, illegality, or a con-
flict of interest), 23 a lack of a rational decision-making process (usually
judged by gross negligence in gathering information or monitoring the
company), 24 or an utter lack of reasonableness in the business purpose for
the decision (essentially amounting to waste of the corporate assets).
25
Moreover, the business judgment rule's presumption applies only to actual
decisions-the rule does not shield directors or officers from inaction due
to willful inattention. Once a court applies the business judgment rule,
however, it becomes exceedingly difficult to void board actions or to im-
pose liability on individual officers or directors.
So how does this assessment of the duty of care and the business
judgment rule relate to information controls? Understanding the relation-
ship between those two doctrines provides a platform for assessing the
viability of potential claims that shareholders might bring against directors
or officers for failing to implement adequate data control systems, even
outside the context of SOX 404. Those duty-of-care claims fall roughly
into four general categories. An assessment of the likelihood of success for
each category follows.
First, shareholders may simply claim that an officer or director made a
bad decision in implementing the information controls. The argument
would be that the board's decision regarding the implementation of infor-
mation controls was simply wrongheaded. Without more, the board's deci-
sion would enjoy the protection of the business judgment rule and remain
wholly immune from attack.
Second, a plaintiff may claim that the decision about the information
controls was so irrational and contrary to the interests of the company as to
constitute a waste of corporate assets. This type of claim would best apply
in cases where a corporation held significant intellectual property assets
that were not adequately protected (e.g., the beverage company failing to
protect its secret recipe). Like the first type of claim, a plaintiff would have
very little chance of success because courts tend to look for any rational
basis to support board decisions. To fmd in favor of a plaintiff, a court
would typically have to conclude that the decision was improvident beyond
23. The plaintiff can show a lack of good faith by demonstrating that the decision was influenced
by fraud, that the decision was illegal, or that the decision was influenced by a conflict of interest. See,
e.g., id.
24. The plaintiff can show a lack of a rational decisionmaking process by proving gross negli-
gence in the officers' or directors' corporate monitoring or information gathering. See, e.g., id. at 872-
75.
25. The plaintiff can show a lack of a rational business purpose by showing that the decision
resulted in a complete waste of corporate assets. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907
A.2d 693, 748-50 (Del. Ch. 2005).
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explanation or outside the realm of reason. Further, to the extent that the
decision was motivated by the expense of the control measures, auditing
services, or other protective practices, courts would likely defer to the of-
ficers' or directors' assessment. Perhaps only if the board decision regard-
ing implementation of information controls was so lax as to constitute an
invitation to steal the intellectual property assets of a corporation would a
claim based on waste seem viable.2
6
Third, shareholders could advance a claim based on willful corporate
inattention to data security. The strategy would be to avoid application of
the business judgment rule presumption. As noted earlier, the business
judgment rule simply doesn't afford protection where board members or
officers embrace unconscious inaction. Instead, board members will get the
business judgment rule's protection only if it considers thoughtfully an
action, regardless of the ultimate substance of the decision made. The claim
would seem tenable in a scenario where a small public or microcap compa-
ny simply failed to address information controls once the requirements of
SOX 404 were lifted.
From an instrumental perspective, the potential viability of a willful
inattention claim would cause directors and officers to assess the problem
of information controls, even if inaction were the ultimate decision. Thus,
the result would perhaps be some sort of cost benefit analysis on the part of
the company-a balancing of the potential costs of implementing internal
controls weighed against any reduction in the risk of harm through data
vulnerability. While the success of a shareholder claim for willful inatten-
tion might seem small, the very existence of the claim might cause a com-
pany to undertake at least some of the measures required under SOX 404
and the SEC Rules.
Finally, shareholders might claim that directors and officers failed to
monitor compliance of corporate practices with applicable laws. Here, the
plaintiff would usually have to prove gross negligence. For example, a
viable claim based on the failure to monitor that amounts to gross negli-
gence might arise if there was a failure to correct a known problem that
could result in significant civil or criminal penalties. 27 But failure to im-
26. In effect, to prevail on this type of claim, a plaintiff would have to show that the controls were
so irrational or contrary to the interests of the corporation that the controls did not merely let the pro-
verbial fox into the henhouse but actually invited the fox into the henhouse.
27. At least one Delaware court has indicated that where criminal statutes clearly proscribe certain
actions or behavior, a board of directors exposes itself to liability for failing to implement adequate
compliance programs even if the board did not suspect any criminal wrongdoing at the company. See In
re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). For a discussion of Sarbanes-
Oxley and criminal penalties, see, for example, David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspective on Sar-
banes-Oxley and the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1781 (2007); Ann
20101
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plement an effective compliance system would likely not surpass the hurdle
of gross negligence; rather, the corporation would have to utterly disregard
establishing a compliance system.2
8
Still, it seems entirely plausible to construct a claim against board
members for failing to implement internal control measures where signifi-
cant threats to data security were known. Similarly, because existing se-
curities laws (outside SOX) require truthful financial disclosures and may
impose significant penalties for non-compliance, boards may have a duty to
implement at least some minimal data control measures to comport with
those mandates. 29 Of course, the precise nature of the data control measures
would remain insulated from liability under the business judgment rule.
Nonetheless, a plaintiff could construct a plausible claim against a board
decision for failing to implement internal control measures, regardless of
the statutory exemption, where the board knew of mismanagement of data
security.
Looking back at the four general categories of shareholder claims,
then, it seems that shareholders might bring potentially successful claims
against companies exempt from SOX 404 in two situations: (1) where there
Marie Tracey & Paul Fiorelli, Nothing Concentrates the Mind Like the Prospect of a Hanging: The
Criminalization of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 125 (2004); Dana E. Hill, Note,
Anticipatory Obstruction of Justice: Pre-Emptive Document Destruction Under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Anti-Shredding Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1519, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 1519 (2004). For a discussion of corpo-
rate whistleblowers and Sarbanes-Oxley, see, for example, Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark?
Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment
Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029 (2004); Terry M. Dworkin, SOXAnd Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV.
1757 (2007); Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-
Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 65 (2007); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp,
Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whis-
tleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REv. 91 (2007); Valerie Watnick, Whistleblower Protections Under the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act: A Primer and a Critique, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 831 (2007).
28. In this monitoring setting, "gross negligence" obviously supplies a heightened standard re-
garding duty, and the leading case indicates that only an "utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable
information and reporting system exists" would give rise to liability. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
Another court imposed liability on a director who knew or should have known of management wrong-
doing yet failed to take any corrective measures. See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 826,
829 (N.J. 1981).
29. For a discussion of the relationship between Sarbanes-Oxley and traditional bodies of securi-
ties law, see, for example, Roberta S. Karmel, The Once and Future New York Stock Exchange: The
Regulation of Global Exchanges, I BROOK J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 355 (2007); Frank B. Cross &
Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of Securities Regulation, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 333 (2006);
Clyde Stoltenberg et al., A Comparative Analysis of Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate Governance
Developments in the US and European Union: The Impact of Tensions Created by Extraterritorial
Application of Section 404, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 457 (2005); Kourtney T. Cowart, Comment, The Sar-
banes-Oxley Act: How a Current Model in the Law of Unintended Consequences May Affect Securities
Litigation, 42 DuQ. L. REv. 293 (2004); Erica Gann, Comment, Judicial Action in Retrograde: The
Case for Applying Section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to All Fraud Actions Under the Securities
Laws, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 1043 (2004); Luke A. E. Pazicky, Note, A New Arrow in the Quiver of Fed-
eral Securities Fraud Prosecutors: Section 807 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 81 WASH. U. L.Q.
801 (2003).
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is an absence of decision making based on willful inattention and (2) where
there has been an utter failure to correct known management abuses to
comply with statutory obligations. While the chances of success even in
those two situations might seem slim, as discussed in the next section, the
basic viability of those claims creates arguably significant problems for
courts that might outweigh a decision to exempt certain companies from
the statutory mandates provided under SOX.
III. DATA SECURITY AND THE COMMON LAW
Most companies comply with the current safe harbor provided by the
Rules under SOX Section 404, and as a result there is a fairly uniform ad-
herence to the internal control standards that agency and independent ex-
perts developed. If the SEC accepts the proposed exemption, the duty of
care nonetheless imposes some sort of obligations on corporations regard-
ing information control. However, articulating the content of those obliga-
tions will be left to the courts as shareholder derivative suits arise.
Necessarily, the judge-made law will rely on the duty of care and the busi-
ness judgment rule to determine the requisite internal controls.
Relying on courts to determine the appropriate internal controls, via
application of the duty of care and the business judgment rule, raises a va-
riety of practical and theoretical problems for courts. Because the duty of
care and the business judgment rule are vague, they do not give corpora-
tions adequate guidance for organizing their behavior. With the content of
the duty and the standards for application varying from one jurisdiction to
the next, a lack of uniformity would inevitably arise. 30 With respect to in-
centives for litigation, relying on judge-made law would encourage share-
holder litigation. In contrast to the statutory framework that more precisely
sets the duties, rights and obligations of various corporate actors, the very
malleability of a common law regime would increase the pool of colorable
claims. Moreover, to the extent a common law framework would increase
the likelihood of shareholder claims, director and officer liability premiums
would likely increase. Those payments, which result simply from added
uncertainty under a common law regime, arguably waste corporate assets
that could be dedicated more efficiently to other endeavors. Furthermore, a
common law regime for assessing the propriety of internal control meas-
ures would fundamentally hamper corporate risk taking. Risk taking is
30. For example, corporations organized under California law will have different information
security standards applied to them than corporations organized under Delaware law. The effect I am
concerned about here is the effect on the market-non-uniform standards would raise the transaction
costs of doing business.
2010]
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necessary to business success, but uncertain and unpredictable standards
could enhance the risk profile of corporate decisions. As a result, boards
might not be willing to undertake measures with those enhanced risks, even
though those same actions would have been taken under a more precisely
defined statutory framework.
On a fundamental level, a significant concern about embracing a
common law framework for assessing the adequacy of information controls
relates the basic purposes of the business judgment rule presumption.
Judges are not experts in business. From an institutional standpoint, judges
seem rather ill suited to make decisions about proper business conduct.
Tasking them with the primary responsibility of articulating internal infor-
mation control standards represents an odd approach, at best. Courts seem
to be one of the last places where sound business principles should be
crafted from scratch.
Finally, the duty of care typically ignores corporate stakeholders that a
statutory framework could consider. The duty of care currently considers
the corporation's interests (and arguably the shareholders' interests) on a
parochial level. The duty does not account for the effect of any particular
action on stakeholders, including the employees of the company and the
community the corporation inhabits. Nor does the duty account for the
larger effects on market integrity, investment security, the environment, or
any other aggregate issues. Thus, while the duty of care treats corporations
as atomized entities that are quite divorced from these other interests, statu-
tory frameworks articulated by legislatures or regulatory agencies could
realistically and effectively take these other interests into account.
IV. CONCLUSION
Granting exemptions from legislative and regulatory frameworks
should be done cautiously. In the case of the proposed exemptions from
SOX's internal control measures, the SEC should reject the proposal be-
cause significant unjustifiable jurisprudential and practical problems will
result.
[Vol 84:3
